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ABSTRACT. The  Antarctic  ’Reaty  System  has  successfully  managed Antarctica and the surrounding Southern Ocean  since 1961 despite the 
existence of conflicting  sovereignty  claims  and calls from the Third World for greater international participation in the continent’s  management. 
The  spectre of  unregulated  mining  activities  in Antarctica  caused the parties to the  Antarctic l h t y  to negotiate the Convention  for  the  Regulation 
of Antarctic Mineral  Resource  Activities in 1988. However, the entry into force of the convention  is now  being  challenged by Australia and 
France,  who propose a prohibition on mining in Antarctica and favour the negotiation of a  comprehensive  environmental  protection  regime 
for the Antarctic.  The  development  of  a  world park in Antarctica has  been mooted since 1972, and during the 1980s various international 
environmental  organizations gave enthusiastic support to the concept. A  meeting  of the Antarctic ’Iteaty  Consultative  Parties  in 1989 resolved 
to further discuss in 1990 the implementation of  comprehensive  environmental protection measures in Antarctica.  While 1990 may  be a  pivotal 
year in the current debate over the environmental future of Antarctica, 1991 is potentially more. significant, as the Antarctic ’Reaty  will then 
become  eligible for a  comprehensive review. This raises the prospect  of substantial changes to the Antarctic regime. 
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&SUM& Le Traite Antarctique a assure la gestion de l’Antarctique et du Bassin antarctique environnant depuis 1961 mals6 l’existence 
de  revendications territoriales conflictuelles  et  des  appels  du  tiers-monde pour une  plus grande participation internationale dans la gestion 
du  continent. La  perspective  d’une xploitation miniere non reglement& dans l’Antarctique  amena  les  parties impliquks dans le .rtaite  Antarctique 
A nkgocier en 1988 la Convention concernant la reglementation  des activitb de  mise n valeur  des  ressources  minerales  en  Antarctique.  LlAustralie 
et  la  France  sont  cependant  en rain de  contester  l’application  de la Convention:  elles  proposent  d’interdire  l’exploitation  miniere  dans  l’Antarctique 
et  penchent  en  faveur  d’une  nkgociation  visant A ktablir un rtgime global  de protection de  l’environnement  en  Antarctique. Dts 1972, on 
a par16 de la creation d‘un parc mondial dans l’Antarctique,  et, durant les  annees 80, plusieurs  organismes  environnementaux internationaux 
ont soutenu ce  projet  avec  enthousiasme.  En 1989, les  diffbrentes parties du comite  consultatif  du ’hi t6  Antarctique se sont reunies et ont 
rtsolu de  poursuivre la discussion en 1990 sur la mise  en  vigueur  de  mesures  globales  de protection de  l’environnement  en  Antarctique. Thdis 
que 1990 pourrait bien  &re une annCe pivot dans le debat actuel sur l’avenir de  l’environnement dans l’Antarctique, 1991 pourrait Stre encore 
plus  importante, vu que c‘est I’annke où le ”Mt6 Antarctique  pourra Stre soumis hune revision  dans  le  detail.  Cette  possibilite  soultve  I’tventualite 
de  changements  d’importance dans le rtgime gouvernant  l’Antarctique. 
Mots cles: Antarctique, droit  international, regime gouvernant  l’exploitation  des  ressources  minerales,  protection  de  l’environnement,  parc  mondial 
’Ttaduit pour le journal par NCsida Loyer. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Antarctic Treaty  system  (ATS)  was dominated for much 
of the 1980s by negotiations  for  the  development of a minerals 
regime.  Despite considerable  pressure  from  states outside the 
ATS and from the United Nations, the Convention for  the 
Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities 
(CRAMRA, 1988) was successfully  negotiated and opened 
for signature in 1988. At no time during the six years of 
negotiations for the minerals  regime  had  there  been  serious 
dissent  among the parties to  the ATS about  the urgent  need 
to negotiate  such a regime  before  any  mining  activity  com- 
menced in Antarctica. However, with the conclusion of 
CRAMRA and its opening for signature came the first hint 
that a rift was about  to develop  within the ATS. After much 
public and political debate, the Australian Government 
announced on 22 May 1989 its intention to not sign 
CRAMRA. It sought  instead to permanently  prohibit  mining 
in Antarctica and to this end commenced a worldwide 
campaign to implement a comprehensive  environmental pro- 
tection regime for the Antarctic. The decision by France to 
also reject  CRAMRA and  support  the Australian  initiative 
showed that concern for the future of the Antarctic 
environment was fast  becoming a major political  issue  within 
the ATS and  that CRAMRA was under threat from a rad- 
ically  different  regime option. 
The Fifteenth Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting 
(ATCM)  was also held in Paris in 1989. At these  meetings 
the Antarctic Treaty  Consultative Parties (ATCPs), a group 
made up of the original signatories to the treaty and other 
states who have over time demonstrated a substantial 
scientific  interest  in the continent, have  implemented  “recom- 
mendations” and created the mechanism  for the negotiation 
of supplementary  conventions to deal  with  matters  of  environ- 
mental concern, such as the protection  of  scientific  sites and 
the control of mineral  activities.  At ATCM XV considerable 
debate took place over  whether the ATS should continue to 
support CRAMRA or instead give formal consideration to 
the implementation of a comprehensive  environmental  pro- 
tection regime,  as proposed by Australia and France, or even 
to consider the claims of certain non-governmental  organi- 
zations (NGOs) that Antarctica be  declared a “world  park.” 
At the conclusion  of the meeting a number  of  recommen- 
dations were agreed upon, with  Recommendations XV-1 and 
XV-2 scheduling  special  meetings to be  held during 1990 in 
an  effort  to resolve the debate that had developed  over the 
merits of CRAMRA and the proposed  environmental  pro- 
tection regime. 
Following the events of 1989, it is obvious that as the 
30-year-old  ATS  enters the 1990s serious  divisions  exist  among 
the treaty parties that could conceivably cause the disin- 
tegration of the regime,  which has so successfully  governed 
Antarctica since 1961. Whether a mining regime such as 
CRAMRA  should  be  adopted  or an environmental  protection 
regime prohibiting  mining  should be  implemented  is a debate 
in which no middle  ground  exists.  When this debate is viewed 
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against the possibility of a comprehensive  review  of the ATS 
in 1991, it is clear that the Antarctic  regime  is  facing a serious 
challenge to its existence. This paper will detail the 
development  of both alternative regimes and then assess the 
prospects for the future. 
THE ATS AND MINERAL RESOURCES 
The 1959 Antarctic Treaty (Antarctic Treaty, 1959) was 
originally signed and ratified by Australia, Argentina, 
Belgium,  Chile,  France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South 
Africa,  the  United  Kingdom,  the  United  States, and the USSR 
(Appendix 1). It came about as a consequence  of  proposals 
put  forward by the United  States for the internationalization 
of Antarctica, partly prompted by the Cold War, and even- 
tually  realized after the 1957-58 International Geophysical 
Year,  when a commitment  emerged to ensure that Antarctica 
remain a non-nuclear and demilitarized continent where 
scientific  goals  and  not  territorial  conquests  could  be  achieved 
(Hayton, 1960). 
Since it came into force  in 1961, a  further 27 states have 
become parties to the treaty, and of the total 39 state parties, 
25 presently  hold  consultative party status (Appendix 1). An 
ATCM is held every two years, during which the ATCPs 
discuss matters of concern that have arisen from the 
implementation of the treaty.  Recommendations  are  agreed 
upon  at these  meetings in an  effort  to rectify  these  concerns 
and often  their  impact  is to implement a new code  of  conduct 
for Antarctic activities. As laid  down by Article IX  of the 
treaty,  these  recommendations can deal  with the peaceful  use 
of Antarctica, scientific  research, the exercise  of jurisdiction 
and preservation and conservation of  living  resources.  Article 
VI  gives the treaty an application to not only the Antarctic 
continent, but all  islands,  seas and ice  shelves that lie  within 
the area south of 60° South latitude, excepting the high  seas. 
One of the unique features of the treaty is the way it dealt 
with  sovereignty  in Antarctica. At the time the treaty came 
into force,  Australia,  Argentina,  Chile,  France, New Zealand, 
Norway and the United  Kingdom  all  had territorial claims 
to  part of the Antarctic continent. The United States and 
the USSR have continually refused to acknowledge the 
validity  of  these  seven territorial claims,  which can partly 
be attributed to their own latent territorial claims never 
formally  asserted  (Auburn, 1982). Despite the existence  of 
these  claims,  Article IV  of the  treaty  has  the  effect of  freezing 
these  claims for the duration of the treaty so as to in effect 
defuse the sovereignty  issue.  Many  commentators  believe  this 
factor has  been the key to the success  of the ATS during its 
30-year  history,  allowing it to survive even the 1982 Falklands 
War  between Argentina and  the United  Kingdom  (Triggs, 
1986). 
Yet while the issue  of  sovereignty  was  successfully  dealt 
with  in the treaty, and demilitarization of the continent was 
guaranteed by Articles I and V, the potential exploitation 
of mineral  resources was a matter not adequately addressed 
by the new  regime. One explanation for the failure of the 
Antarctic Tkeaty to adequately  deal  with this issue  is that 
at the time of its  negotiation  there was little prospect of com- 
mercial  mining  activity taking place on the continent. While 
the 1957-58 International Geophysical Year gave a much 
needed  focus and boost to geological  surveys and research 
on the continent, resulting in the discovery of numerous 
mineral  deposits, it was generally  considered that  the con- 
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centrations  in  these  deposits were not large  enough to be  com- 
mercially  exploitable  (Wright and Williams, 1974). Factors 
such as high  exploration  costs, the expense  of  large-scale 
mining operations in the harsh Antarctic environment, the 
high transportation costs to warm-water ports, and the need 
to have  very large deposits to make  extraction  commercially 
viable  all contributed to  a general  skepticism as to whether 
commercial mining in Antarctica would ever take place 
(Potter, 1969). However, the  discovery  in 1973 by the Glomar 
Challenger of ethane and methane gas in the Ross  Sea area, 
the first major evidence that a commercially exploitable 
petroleum resource might exist in the Antarctic, was the 
catalyst for the ATS to recognize that commercial  mining 
in  Antarctica  could  eventually  become a reality  (Mitchell and 
Kimball, 1979). This development in the 1970s, plus the 
advances in polar mining technology flowing from the 
Alaskan  oil  fields,  forced the ATS to take anticipatory action 
and negotiate an Antarctic minerals regime before 
unregulated  mining actually commenced.  However,  despite 
these  developments there was little change  in opinion during 
the 1980s that  the reserves that did  exist  were  small in size 
and when  combined  with the problems and costs  associated 
with the exploitation of  minerals  reserves  in the Antarctic 
made mineral  activities in Antarctica commercially  unviable 
(Tessensohn, 1986; Larminie, 1987). 
The Negotiation of an Antarctic Minerals  Regime 
The first formal proposal put forward  within the ATS for 
the negotiation of an Antarctic minerals  regime was made 
at ATCM  VI during 1970. However,  it  was not until ATCM 
IX, in 1977, that the ATCPs dealt  with the matter by way 
of a recommendation. In response to  a report prepared by 
a Working Group of Experts on Exploration and Exploi- 
tation of Antarctic Minerals, Recommendation IX-1 was 
adopted to deal with Antarctic mineral resources (Bush, 
1982). The  recommendation,  calling  for the eventual  creation 
of an Antarctic minerals  regime,  imposed a moratorium on 
Antarctic mining. In particular, it provided that “pending 
the timely adoption of  agreed solutions pertaining to explo- 
ration and exploitation  of  mineral  resources,  no  activity  shall 
be  conducted to explore or exploit  such  resources’’  (Bush, 
1982345). A further four years  passed  before  guidelines were 
laid  down for the actual negotiation of the new minerals 
regime, the delay partly due to negotiations over the Con- 
vention for  the Conservation of Antarctic Marine  Living 
Resources  only  having  concluded in 1980 (CCAMLR, 1980). 
Recommendation XI-1, approved at ATCM XI in 1981, 
reaffirmed  the  commitment  of ATCPs to the early  conclusion 
of a regime for Antarctic mineral  resources and laid down 
the principles upon which  such a regime should be based. 
These  included the requirement that ATCPs should continue 
to play an active and responsible  role  in  dealing  with the 
question of Antarctic mineral  resources, that  the Antarctic 
Treaty  be  maintained in its entirety, that protection  of the 
unique Antarctic environment and of its dependent 
ecosystems  should  be a basic consideration, that the interests 
of all mankind in Antarctica should not be  prejudiced by 
the regime, and  that  the provisions  of Article IV  of the Ant- 
arctic  Treaty  dealing  with  sovereignty should not be affected 
by the regime  (Bush, 1982). A Special  Consultative  Meeting 
was convened to negotiate the new regime and the first 
meeting was  held  in  Wellington  in June 1982 (Auburn, 1982). 
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CRAMRA 
The formal minerals negotiations commenced in Wel- 
lington during 1982 and did not conclude until  June 1988, 
during which time 12 sessions  of the Special Consultative 
Meeting were held. The negotiations quickly  became  centred 
around a draft minerals regime  proposed by a New Zealand 
official, Christopher Beeby, with the so-called “Beeby I” 
to “Beeby VII” drafts forming the basis for the eventual  con- 
vention (Beck, 1989a). 
CRAMRA is based on the premise that “Antarctica 
remains  closed to mineral  resource  activities  except  when the 
regime decides to identify an area for exploration and 
development in  the light of  relevant information and advice, 
most notably that concerning possible environmental 
impacts”  (Beck, 1989a:19-20). Prospecting, exploration and 
development  of Antarctic mineral  resources are regulated, 
with each activity required to meet a higher standard of 
environmental care.  The Antarctic Mineral  Resources  Com- 
mission  is the primary institution created  by  CRAMRA.  The 
commission has 24 specific functions assigned to it by Article 
21, with other functions assigned to it throughout  the con- 
vention. The commission is  given the initial responsibility 
of  determining  whether an area  is to be  opened up for possible 
exploration and development. Under Article 41 the com- 
mission  is to ensure that  an area being identified for minerals 
activity is a coherent unit for the purposes of resource 
management, and it may  specify  which  mineral  resources  can 
be  explored for and developed, as well as imposing  general 
guidelines  relating to the operational requirements for explo- 
ration  and development in an area (Joyner, 1988). 
Despite the significant power of the commission, the 
Regulatory Committee, established by Article 29, has the 
ultimate power to accept or reject the development  of  mineral 
activity  within a specified  area.  The  committee,  with a mem- 
bership of 10, including the state or states asserting claims 
in the area under consideration, can also approve  “manage- 
ment  schemes” for areas  being  developed and monitor  explo- 
ration and development  activities taking place  (Joyner, 1988). 
Article 3 specifically prohibits Antarctic mineral resource 
activities  from  being  conducted outside of the controls estab- 
lished by CRAMRA, with further provisions in Article 7 
detailing the obligations of  each party  to comply  with and 
to encourage other states to comply  with the objectives and 
principles of the convention (Beck, 1989a). In  an  important 
concession to  the claims of environmentalists, Article 8 of 
CRAMRA  establishes a liability regime for damage “to  the 
Antarctic environment or dependent or associated 
ecosystems”  resulting  from mineral resource activity (Bur- 
mester, 1989). 
Will CRAMRA Enter into Force? 
Given the stance taken by Australia and France in 1989 
and  the February 1990 announcement  of Prime Minister G. 
Palmer “to set aside consideration of the ratification of 
CRAMRA by  New Zealand,”  it  is  worthwhile considering 
whether the convention will  ever come into force (Palmer, 
19W1). The  convention was open for signature  in  Wellington 
for twelve months  from 25 November 1988. At the end of 
this period only 19 states had  signed  (Appendix 1). Entry 
into force of the convention depends on  the requirements 
of Article 62 being  met.  The article lays down a detailed 
formula  and requires: 1) that 16 of the ATCPs that partic- 
ipated at the final session of the Fourth Special ATCM 
become a party; 2) that this number  includes all the states 
necessary to constitute all  the institutions of the convention; 
3) that  the institutions are established in every area of Ant- 
arctica; and, 4) that the number include 5 developing 
countries and 11 developed countries. 
Given then the present attitude of Australia, France and 
New Zealand  towards  CRAMRA,  will the requirements of 
Article 62 ever  be met?  As to  the first requirement, at  the 
conclusion of the Fourth  Special ATCM in June 1988 at Wel- 
lington there were 20 ATCPs, so the refusal of 3 to become 
parties to CRAMRA can not affect this requirement. 
Likewise, the  fourth requirement that a mix  of  developing 
and developed  ATCPs  become parties to CRAMRA  is not 
affected, there being  enough  remaining ATCPs to still meet 
this  part of the formula. The second requirement can also 
be fulfilled with  respect to the Antarctic Mineral  Resources 
Commission, the Scientific Technical and Environmental 
Advisory  Committee and the Special Meeting  of  Members 
without the participation of Australia, France or New 
Zealand. However, difficulty does  exist  with the composition 
of the Regulatory Committee  (Blay and Tsamenyi, 1989). 
Under Article 29, this committee  must  be  composed  of 10 
members,  of  which  one or more  must  be the states that assert 
rights or claims in an area identified for minerals  activity. 
Consequently, without Australian, French or New Zealand 
participation in CRAMRA  it would  seem that the Regulatory 
Committee could not undertake consideration of any 
resources activity in the Australian Antarctic Territory  (Aus- 
tralia), Adelie  Land (France) or  the Ross  Dependency  (New 
Zealand). This would also seem to result in the third 
requirement not being met. 
While the formula laid down in Article 62 would  seem to 
ensure that, following the Australian and French rejection 
of  CRAMRA and  the New  Zealand  decision to set  aside  ratifi- 
cation, entry into force  is  now  impossible, an argument has 
been  made that it still may  be  possible for CRAMRA to enter 
into force (Blay and Tsamenyi, 1989). If this were to occur 
and a group of determined states sought to implement 
CRAMRA  without  Australian,  French  and New Zealand par- 
ticipation, then it would  be a test of international law as to 
whether the convention  effectively  came into force.  Whether 
this  stage  will  ever  be  reached, though, may  very  much  depend 
on events in 1990. 
AN ANTARCTIC WORLD PARK REGIME 
Given that  the Antarctic Treaty  was  negotiated to ensure 
the continuation of  scientific  research in a demilitarized con- 
tinent free of the threats of the Cold War and sovereignty 
disputes, there was little emphasis in  the treaty on  the pro- 
tection of the Antarctic environment. This does not mean 
to imply that  the ATCPs totally ignored this issue: conser- 
vation in Antarctica was  raised at ATCM I in 1961 when the 
British delegation called for the recognition of Antarctica 
as a “nature reserve,”  while the Soviet delegation suggested 
in 1964 that Antarctica be  declared an “international wild 
life  reserve”  (Myhre, 1986). An early response by the ATS 
to concerns about the preservation of the Antarctic 
environment was the 1964 Agreed  Measures for  the Conser- 
vation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora, whereby special pro- 
tective  regimes  were  implemented for Sites  of Special 
Scientific Interest, Specially Protected Areas and Sites of 
Historic  Interest  (Bush, 1982). More  recently, the ATS has 
reacted to concern about the exploitation  of  Antarctic  living 
resources  through the 1972 Convention for the Conservation 
of Antarctic Seals (CCAS) and CCAMLR, which  was 
finalized in 1980 (CCAS, 1972; CCAMLR, 1980). 
The  Emergence of the  World  Park Concept 
The first  call for Antarctica to be  declared  a  world park 
came at the 1972 Second  World  Conference on National  Parks 
held at Grand Teton National Park in the United  States. The 
conference,  sponsored by the International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), 
“unanimously  recommended that the Antarctic continent 
and its surrounding seas be established  as the first  World 
Park, under the auspices  of the United Nations” (Barnes, 
1982:244). Notes  of  this  conference were forwarded to the 
ATCPs,  with New Zealand  taking particular interest  in the 
concept. 
In 1975 New Zealand took to ATCM VI11 in Oslo a 
proposal for the establishment  of an Antarctic  world park. 
While the proposal won support from  Chile, it was  never 
formally  placed upon  the agenda and there  is no reference 
to the New Zealand  initiative  in the official report of the 
meeting (Rothwell, 1990). The IUCN, however, continued 
to pursue the concept  of a world park  and at the 1982 World 
National Parks Congress  held  in  Bali  succeeded  in  having 
a  motion  approved  stating that “the concept of a  world park 
and  other  appropriate  designations  should  be  developed  more 
urgently” for Antarctica  (Mosley, 1984:320). Since the early 
1980s though, IUCN’s  role in the world park debate has 
diminished  as other high-profile  environmental groups 
developed the concept further and gained support from 
several influential ATCPs (Kimball, 1988). 
NGOs and  the  World  Park Option 
The Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF), 
Greenpeace and the  Antarctic and Southern  Ocean  Coalition 
(ASOC)  have  become  increasingly  influential  in  Antarctic 
affairs during the past decade. Initially active in the 
negotiations for CCAMLR  because  df  their  concern about 
the impact  of  commercial  fishing  in the Southern Ocean and 
the  effect  this  would  have  upon the Antarctic  ecosystem,  they 
played  a  significant  role in  the negotiation  of  CRAMRA. 
During  much of this  time  many  NGOs  were  calling for stricter 
environmental  measures to be  implemented  in  Antarctica and 
some  advocated the world park option. Geoff  Mosley,  of 
ACF,  was particularly  responsible for developing the world 
park debate. He has argued that Antarctica  is the “last great 
wilderness” on the  planet and as  such  should  be  permanently 
protected. While acknowledging the possibility of 
implementing a comprehensive  protection  regime  for  the  Ant- 
arctic environment through the ATS or even the 1972 
UNESCO  World  Heritage  Convention,  Mosley has consis- 
tently  argued that only through a  world park designation 
could permanent environmental  protection be achieved.  For 
Mosley,  a  world park in  Antarctica  would  mean the priority 
maintenance  of  Antarctica’s  wilderness  condition, the zoning 
of special areas with strict management plans for use as 
scientific  bases or transport and communication purposes, 
the prohibition of  all  mineral  activities, and the creation  of 
an authority or agency to coordinate  these  activities  (Mosley, 
1986). 
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Greenpeace and ASOC  have  also  played  a  prominent  role 
in the world park debate.  Greenpeace’s  Antarctic  policy  calls 
for  the complete  protection of Antarctic  wildlife, that the 
protection  of the wilderness  values of the Antarctic  should 
be paramount, that Antarctica remain a zone of limited 
scientific  activity,  with cooperation among scientists of all 
nations, and that it also  be a zone  of  peace  free from all 
military  activities  (Greenpeace, 1986). Mineral  activities are 
totally incompatible with Greenpeace Antarctic policy. 
Greenpeace  has  also  argued for the establishment of an Ant- 
arctic Environmental Protection Agency to ensure that 
“. . . all  scientific,  logistical and tourist  activities  undertaken 
in the Antarctic are examined and managed  according to a 
consistent set of standards, and to provide for uniform 
enforcement of rules, regulations and measures’’ (Green- 
peace, 1986:lO). 
ASOC  sees the world park proposal  as  a  means “to ensure 
that the natural environment  of the Antarctic  is  forever  pro- 
tected” (ASOC, 19893). It acknowledges that this policy 
could be achieved  by  various  means,  of  which one would 
be the negotiation  of  a  conservation  convention through the 
ATS. The principles upon which the new regime  would  be 
based are that the Antarctic  be an area  where  wilderness 
values are paramount and  that there  be  comprehensive  con- 
servation  of flora, fauna  and the environment; that the Ant- 
arctic be an area  of  limited  scientific  research,  encouraging 
cooperation among scientists of all nations; and  that  it also 
be an area of peace,  free of nuclear and other weapons and 
all  military  activities  (ASOC, 19893). To attain these  goals 
ASOC  argues that it  would  be  necessary  for a new  legal  regime 
in  the form of an Antarctic  Conservation  Convention to be 
negotiated. 
The NGOs are therefore  in  agreement that an Antarctic 
world park would  involve the prohibition  of  mining  activities 
and the continuation of  current  activities on the continent 
consistent  with the attainment of  peaceful  scientific  goals. 
Comprehensive  environmental  protection  measures  would  be 
put in  place by a coordinating  agency and the most  effective 
method to achieve  these  aims  within the current ATS would 
be by way of a convention  (Rothwell, 1990). 
Australian  Policy in 1989 
When  CRAMRA  opened  for  signature  in  late 1988 a debate 
commenced  in  Australia as to whether  the  government  should 
be a party to the convention. The matter was formally  con- 
sidered by the government on various  occasions  in April and 
May 1989, during which time it  became  known that Prime 
Minister R. J. Hawke  was  opposed to mining and would  fight 
to protect the “unique Antarctic  environment”  (Seccombe, 
1989:8). The pressure upon the government to not sign 
CRAMRA  increased  in  early May,  when the  opposition  called 
for a convention to prohibit  mining in Antarctica and the 
Senate  also gave notice that  it was opposed to CRAMRA. 
Given the opposition within  Australia  towards  CRAMRA, 
it came  as no surprise  when on 22 May the prime  minister 
announced that Australia  would not sign CRAMRA and 
instead commence a campaign to “pursue the urgent 
negotiation  of a comprehensive  environmental  protection 
convention  within the framework  of the Antarctic Beaty 
system” (Hawke et ai., 19891). 
The prime minister took the opportunity during an 
overseas tour in June 1989 to win support for the Australian 
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proposal. However, only the French  Government  expressed 
total support. During  this tour details were outlined on Aus- 
tralia’s  conception  of the proposed  conservation  regime. In 
a  speech to the  National  Press  Club  in  Washington,  the  prime 
minister argued for the negotiation of an Antarctic 
Environment  Protection  Convention,  which  would  contain: 
An agreement to protect  Antarctica’s  environment  and 
ecosystems,  fully respect its  wilderness  qualities,  respect  its 
significance  for  regional  and  global  environments,  and  protect 
its scientific value; A ban on mining; In regard to other 
activities, arrangements  which  will  let us  assess  the  impact 
of proposed  Antarctic  activities or facilities; A means of deter- 
mining  whether  sufficient  knowledge  exists to enable  adequate 
impact assessment; Agreement not to undertake activities 
where  there  is insufficient  knowledge to judge  whether  they 
are environmentally sound; And criteria and standards to 
enable those judgments to be made [Hawke, 1989a:259]. 
During  a  return  visit to Australia by French  Prime  Minister 
Rocard, it was announced on 18 August that Australia and 
France had reached  agreement on an initiative to promote 
the protection of the Antarctic environment. In a joint 
statement, Prime Ministers  Hawke and Rocard gave notice 
of the intention to submit the  AustraliadFrench proposal 
to ATCM XV at Paris,  “with  a view to holding  a  special 
meeting  of the consultative  parties  in 1990 in order to draw 
up  and  adopt a convention  along  these  lines”  (Hawke and 
Rocard, 1989:445). 
THE 1989 PARIS ATCM 
The most important debate in 1989 concerning the joint 
AustraliadFrench proposal for an environmental  protection 
regime  in  Antarctica took place at ATCM  XV in  Paris.  Not 
only did Australia and France go  to Paris  with  proposals for 
strengthening  environmental  measures  within the ATS, but 
a number  of other ATCPs,  such as Chile  (Antarctic  Treaty, 
1989e),  New Zealand  (Antarctic Tkeaty,  1989d) and Sweden 
(Antarctic  Treaty, 19890 also  prepared  working  papers for 
discussion. 
Once ATCM  XV opened, the agenda was quickly 
dominated by concerns among the ATCPs over whether 
CRAMRA was still  a  legitimate  regime  worthy  of support 
or if the  proposals for strengthened  environmental  protection 
in  Antarctica now meant that priority  should be given to the 
negotiation  of  such a new  regime.  However, despite  general 
agreement  over  the  need to ensure  protection  of  the  Antarctic 
environment, there was  disagreement  over  whether  a  series 
of  recommendations  would  be adequate to achieve  this goal 
or whether,  as  proposed by Australia and France, a compre- 
hensive  convention to declare  Antarctica  wilderness  reserve 
was necessary (Antarctic Treaty,  1989c:2). The Aus- 
tralian/French  proposal, though not expressly  providing for 
the prohibition  of  all  minerals  activities  in  Antarctica,  argued 
that: “Throughout the Antarctic, human activities  having 
an impact on the environment  shall  be  regulated  or,  where 
agreed  as  necessary,  prohibited”  (Antarctic  Treaty, 1989c:2). 
The meeting was therefore  faced  with  whether  it  would  accept 
the proposals put forward  in the various  working  papers and 
the consequential impact this may have upon the basic 
assumption upon which  CRAMRA  was  negotiated - that 
Antarctic  minerals  activities  would  eventually  take  place -
or instead adopt a piecemeal approach to solving  environ- 
mental  problems  in  Antarctica by way of further appropriate 
recommendations. 
Eventually,  after  considerable  debate, it was decided that 
further consideration  be  given to the various  working  papers 
on protection  of the Antarctic  environment,  while  also  con- 
tinuing to work  towards the implementation  of  CRAMRA. 
Accordingly,  two  recommendations  were  approved.  Recom- 
mendation XV-1 provided for a “Special  Antarctic Tkeaty 
Consultative  Meeting to be  held  in 1990 to explore and discuss 
all  proposals  relating to the comprehensive  protection  of the 
Antarctic environment and its dependent and associated 
ecosystems”  (Antarctic Tkeaty,  1989a).  CRAMRA  was con- 
sidered  in  Recommendation XV-2,  which  called for  a  meeting 
be  held during 1990 “to explore and discuss  all  proposals 
relating to Article 8(7)” of CRAMRA (Antarctic Treaty, 
1989b). 
Recommendation XV-1 
Recommendation XV-1  is a significant  step in  the eventual 
implementation of a proposed environmental protection 
regime. In the  past,  a  Special ATCM has  been  used  as  a  forum 
to negotiate  supplementary  conventions  such as CCAMLR 
and CRAMRA, so this  recommendation  puts in place the 
mechanism for the eventual creation of a convention to 
implement the Australian/French  proposal. The recommen- 
dation lays  down the requirements of the perceived  compre- 
hensive  regime for the protection of the Antarctic 
environment, noting the importance of  reviewing the 
operation of the already  existing  measures and determining 
how they  could  be  strengthened, the need to state legal  obli- 
gations  with  greater  precision,  the  importance  of  establishing 
procedures to assess the impact of human activities on the 
Antarctic  environment and determining  what institutional 
arrangements are necessary to ensure the “maintenance, 
integration,  consistency and comprehensiveness  of  the  system 
of  protection  of  the  Antarctic  environment and its  dependent 
and associated ecosystems’’ (Antarctic Treaty, 1989a). 
While the recommendation  makes no express  reference to 
Antarctica  being  declared  a  wilderness  reserve or a  world 
park, there is certainly an underlying theme that present 
environmental  protection  measures are inadequate and  that 
a  stronger  regime  needs to be  put  in  place.  It  is  also  significant 
that the recommendation  contemplates the development  of 
such  a  comprehensive  environmental  protection  regime  within 
the current structure of the ATS, unlike the New Zealand 
proposal of 1975, which contemplated the internationali- 
zation of  Antarctic  administration. 
Recommendation X V 2  
Recommendation XV-2 calls for a special  meeting to be 
held  in  1990 to consider  all  proposals  relating to Article  8(7) 
of CRAMRA. Article  8  generally  deals  with e liability  of 
Antarctic  minerals  resource operators for any  damage that 
may  occur to the Antarctic  environment or dependent or 
associated  ecosystems as a consequence  of  those  operations. 
Strict liability is imposed upon these operators, with 
xceptions made only in case of natural disasters, armed 
conflict or acts of  terrorism  (Burmester,  1989). The provisions 
of  Article  8(7)  in particular provide for further rules and 
procedures to be  elaborated  through an additional Protocol 
to CRAMRA. It is  anticipated that these  provisions  may 
contain limits on liability  in  certain situations, procedures 
for claims to be  made against an operator, and measures to 
respond to environmental  damage in cases  where an operator 
is  unable to act. While the recommendation  is certainly an 
attempt to ensure that CRAMRA  is a more environmentally 
responsive  regime, it is based on the assumption that 
CRAMRA will  eventually  come into force. 
ANTARCTICA AND THE  THIRD WORLD 
In what  is  considered to be a watershed in Antarctic  politics, 
Malaysian  Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohammad, in a 
1982  speech to the United  Nations  General  Assembly, ques- 
tioned the legitimacy  of the ATS and suggested that it  be 
replaced by a new regime that would allow the resource 
potential of the continent to benefit all states and  not  just 
those select few parties to the Antarctic ”eaty. He claimed 
that Antarctica did not 
. . . legally belong to the discoverers, just as the colonial ter- 
ritories do not belong to the colonial powers. Like the seas 
and the sea-bed, these uninhabited  lands  belong to the inter- 
national community. The countries now claiming them must 
give them up so that the United Nations can  administer these 
lands or the present  occupants  can  act  as  trustees for the 
nations of the world  [Mahathir, 19821. 
This speech,  coming  soon after the conclusion  of the Third 
United  Nations  Conference on  the Law  of the Sea, which 
had  recognized the applicability of the “common heritage 
of mankind”  to  the deep seabed, was the catalyst for con- 
siderable international debate about  the status and interna- 
tional acceptability of the ATS (United Nations, 1984). 
Antarctica has been considered at both committee and 
General Assembly levels at  the United Nations since the 
Mahathir speech, with debate very much  being  between the 
Third  World and ATCPs  (Beck,  1989b). Yet while the 
criticisms  of  Malaysia and other Third  World  states  were  taken 
seriously within United Nations’ forums, there is little 
evidence that the ATS has responded to these  claims.  Though 
Third World states are eligible to accede to  the Antarctic 
Peaty, many are incapable of  mounting  scientific  expeditions 
to Antarctica in order to become  eligible for ATCP status. 
Hence, as non-consultative parties, they are unable to  par- 
ticipate  in the negotiation and  implementation  of  recommen- 
dations at  an ATCM and  in reality  they  have little more than 
observer status. Some concessions were granted to Third 
World claims for greater participation in Antarctic affairs 
in both  the Preamble and Article 6 of CRAMRA where 
reference  is  made to  the role of  developing countries. Article 
62 also specifically  provides that five  developing countries 
that have consultative party status must  become parties to 
CRAMRA before the convention will enter into force. Yet 
apart from these concessions, there are few incentives for 
Third World and developing states to benefit from the 
minerals regime. 
Despite the apparent failure of the Third  World to win 
significant concessions  allowing  them  easier  access to par- 
ticipate in an ATCM or benefit from  CRAMRA, it would 
be  unwise to completely  dismiss  Third  World concerns as 
irrelevant in the current debate. To date very few Asian, 
Islamic or black African states  have  taken up  the opportunity 
to become  parties to the ATS.  However,  if  they do, then certain 
of the ATCPs could come under increasing pressure to 
articulate Third  World  policies within the ATS. A refusal to 
recognize the interest  of the Third  World in the current debate 
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could result in a refusal by the Third  World to recognize the 
new  regime, whether it be  CRAMRA, a world park,  or  an 
environmental protection regime. Given the technological 
advances  made by some Islamic and Southeast Asian states 
during the past  decade and the possibility  of  technology  used 
in arctic mining operations being exported to these states, 
it is  possible to conceive that disenchanted  Third  World states 
could attempt  to commence  mining activities in Antarctica 
irrespective  of  any ATS  regime in place. To ensure that  the 
regime  emerging  from the current debate is  respected in  the 
future, it may  well  be  necessary to give considerably more 
weight to Third  World  opinion than ATCPs  have done in 
the past. 
A 1991 REVIEW CONFERENCE? 
While  Recommendations XV-1 and XV-2  would  seem to 
indicate that 1990  will  be a critical year for  the ATS, a possi- 
bility exists that  an Antarctic Treaty  Review Conference may 
be  held in 1991 or any time thereafter. In 1991 the Antarctic 
Peaty will  have  been in force for thirty years, and this is the 
trigger for  the provisions in Article XI1 (2) of the Antarctic 
Peaty  to become  operative. Article XI1  (2a)  provides that 
any consultative party may, after the treaty has been in force 
for thirty years, call for a review  conference,  such a conference 
to be  held as soon as practicable. Articles XI1  (2b) and (2c) 
go  on  to provide a formula for amending the treaty,  with 
the significant feature being that if  any  of the amendments 
to the treaty adopted at the review  conference  have not entered 
into force within two  years, then any contracting party to 
the treaty may  withdraw. It should therefore be  made  clear 
that the procedure established under Article XII(2) does not 
ensure self-destruction of the treaty, but rather a review 
process that gives  member states unhappy  with the amended 
treaty an option  to withdraw. 
What is the possibility of a consultative party calling for 
a review  conference? It would  seem that  at present there is 
little prospect of a review  being  called for in 1991. There has 
been continued harmony  among the ATCPs  ever  since the 
ATS was created, and  the criticism  they  have  faced in the 
United  Nations for the past eight years has probably united 
them  even further to ensure the continued success  of the ATS. 
Despite the apparent failure of  CRAMRA, Australia and 
France have  been careful to state that they  will not “sign” 
the convention, while  New Zealand has “set aside” for the 
time  being  any consideration of ratification. This still leaves 
open the possibility that all three ATCPs could become full 
parties to CRAMRA in the  future if in the case  of Australia 
and France  they were to accede or  to accept the convention 
or if  New Zealand were to ratify CRAMRA. It is still  possible 
therefore that  the requirements of Article 62 could be  met. 
So while it may  seem that  the present debate within the 
ATS on whether  CRAMRA or  an environmental protection 
regime  is the best option to follow, the Australian, French 
and New Zealand positions on CRAMRA are not irreversible 
and it is  possible that  the minerals  regime  can still come into 
effect if an alternative environmental protection regime  is 
not agreed  upon. The position of the newer  ATCPs is also 
such that they  have  more to gain from  continued participation 
in  the ATS than by operating outside of it. Article XII(2) 
provides a method for withdrawal  from the treaty and not 
dissolution, so that a disgruntled party to the treaty may 
withdraw without necessarily  bringing  down the whole treaty 
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system. It can therefore  be  argued that the essential  unity 
within the ATS and  the benefits  of  membership are such to 
ensure that  no consultative party would  call a review con- 
ference  in 1991 unless it was in an effort to use the forum 
of the review conference to conclusively  debate and decide 
upon the CRAMRA or environmental protection regime 
options (Blay et al., 1989). 
CONCLUSIONS 
The events of 1989 have undoubtedly left some scars 
within the ATS that will take considerable time to heal. 
Despite  assurances that their  commitment is genuine  (Hawke, 
1989b)’ the  sudden  decision to abandon CRAMRA  in  favour 
of a more environmentally sensitive view of Antarctic 
management has left some states suspicious of the real 
motives  behind the Australian and French  policy  reversal. 
Were the decisions by these  two  governments to support an 
environmental  protection  regime  a  reaction o the significant 
political power now generated by the so-called “Green” 
parties in both countries, or is this a real and genuine 
attempt to implement a bold new conservation  regime for 
a  complete  continent the like  of  which  has  never  been  seen 
before? 
The  working  papers  dealing  with  the  Antarctic  environment 
presented at ATCM  XV and the decision  of New Zealand 
to also abandon CRAMRA,  which alone must  signify that 
international support for CRAMRA is fading given the 
important role  played  by  New Zealand  in the negotiation  of 
the convention,  must go some way to answering  concerns 
about Australian and French bona fides. The present  debate 
also  differs  significantly  from that tentatively  initiated by  New 
Zealand in 1975. There has been no suggestion on this 
occasion that  the new regime  would  result  in the “interna- 
tionalization”  of  the  continent, so that administration  would 
be turned over to a body such  as the United  Nations and 
all  sovereignty  claims  would  be  disregarded. Instead all the 
proposals that have  been  made, both at ATCM  XV and by 
NGOs,  contemplate  a  regime  operating  within the ATS and 
continuing to acknowledge the existence of sovereignty 
claims. 
Without  CRAMRA  in  place,  mining  in  Antarctica  remains 
unregulated.  Recommendation  IX-1  imposed a moratorium 
on Antarctic  mining  till the “timely adoption” of  a  minerals 
regime. The ATS is  therefore  faced  with the fundamental 
decision  of  whether  minerals  activity  will or will not take 
place  in  Antarctica.  If  this  is  answered in  the negative and 
CRAMRA  is  totally  abandoned,  then  a  second  decision  must 
be made on whether a comprehensive  environmental  pro- 
tection  regime is to be implemented by  way of a new con- 
vention or whether Antarctic environmental issues will 
continue to be  dealt  with by recommendations and specific 
conventions that deal with particular issues. Beyond this 
debate  looms 1991 and  the prospect  of the ATS dissolving. 
Antarctica  needs  a  stable  regime  such as  that provided by 
the Antarctic Treaty during the last thirty years for  it to 
continue to be  a  place  of  peace  where  wilderness and  not 
man reigns  supreme. It is hoped that during the debate  over 
a  comprehensive  Antarctic  environmental  protection  regime 
irreparable  damage  will  not be done to the basis that has 
created  such  a  stable  legal and political  environment for the 
past thirty years. 
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APPENDIX 1. CONTRACTING PARTIES TO 
THE ANTARCTIC  TREATY 
Below are  listed in chronological  order  the  dates  of  ratification by the  original 
signatories of the  Antarctic  Treaty,  the  dates  of  accession  or  succession by 
other  states,  and  the  dates on which  consultative  party  status  was  granted. 
Details  are also given on  whether  the  parties to the  Antarctic Treaty  have 
signed  CRAMRA. 
Key: OS = original signatory, S = signatory, CP = consultative party, 
AS = acceding state, * = claimant state. 
United  Kingdom* 
South  Africa 
Belgium 
Japan 
United  States  of 
Norway* 
France* 
New Zealand* 
Soviet  Union 
Poland 
Argentina* 
Australia* 
Chile* 
Czechoslovakia 
Denmark 
Netherlands 
Romania 
German Dem. Rep. 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Fed. Rep. of Germany 
Uruguay 
Papua New Guinea 
Italy 
Peru 
Spain 
People’s Rep. of 
China 
India 
Hungary 
Sweden 
Finland 
Cuba 
Rep.  of  Korea 
Greece 
Dem. Peoples Rep. of 
Korea 
Austria 
Ecuador 
Canada 
Colombia 
America 
Antarctic Treaty 
31/05/1960 
21/06/1960 
26/07/1960 
04/08/1960 
18/08/1960 
24/08/1960 
16/09/1960 
01/11/1960 
02/11/1960 
08/06/1961 
23/06/1961 
23/06/1961 
23/06/1961 
14/06/1962 
20/05/1965 
30/03/1967 
15/09/1971 
19/11/1974 
16/05/1975 
11/09/1978 
05/02/1979 
11/01/1980 
16/03/1981 
18/03/1981 
10/04/1981 
31/03/1982 
08/06/1983 
19/08/1983 
27/01/1984 
24/04/1984 
15/05/1984 
16/08/1984 
28/11/1986 
08/01/1987 
21/01/1987 
25/08/1987 
15/09/1987 
04/05/1988 
31/01/1989 
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